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There is an on-going debate about the level of savings in New Zealand.  A fundamental 
question pervades the debate: namely, are we saving enough?  This question arises at 
two levels: for the economy as a whole and for individual households.  At the 
macroeconomic level, the concern is whether our aggregate level of saving as a nation is 
“adequate”.  At the micro level, the same question arises in relation to the saving for 
retirement: are New Zealanders adequately preparing for retirement?  This paper 
addresses the second of these questions.  It develops a model of retirement wealth 
accumulation based on the findings from the Household Savings Survey.  The evidence 
we present, tentative though it is, does suggest that there may not be widespread under-
saving for retirement.  The results are consistent with overseas findings. 
We have chosen conservative assumptions: excluding equity in the primary residence 
from estimates of retirement wealth, providing for full survivor benefits and assuming that 
consumption spending would be maintained at pre-retirement levels throughout retirement 
rather than the typical pattern of falling consumption spending as people age. 
It must be stressed that there is limited information about the rate at which individuals are 
actually saving, making it difficult to establish a solid benchmark against which to measure 
adequacy.  We have used the Household Economic Survey as a basis for estimating 
actual saving rates for different age groups.  The estimates are affected by definitions of 
consumption, in particular how the expenditure on durables is treated.  We conduct 
sensitivity tests where durables are both included and excluded as an item of current 
consumption.  Typically we find that the actual saving rates do in fact exceed the rates 
needed for maintaining living standards in retirement.  This reinforces our tentative 
conclusion that there is no apparent gross under-saving for retirement especially in the 
older age cohorts.  
The results apply to broad groups within which there will be a distribution of people some 
of whom would likely not be saving at a rate to maintain their real standard of living in 
retirement.  The results in no way imply that every individual is saving “adequately”. 
 While we present results for younger age cohorts, the fact they still have many years to 
retirement implies that estimates made today inevitably carry much wider margins of error.  
More unequivocal results must await better data and methodologies; improved measures 
of household saving levels, and the application of micro-simulation models which are 
more suited to capturing uncertainty about health status, employment, incomes and life 
expectancies will improve our understanding of household saving behaviour. 
New Zealand superannuation (NZS) provides the floor under the income for the lowest 40 
percent of the income distribution, and for many in this group additional saving for 
retirement would not be a preferred strategy, assuming they were to be aiming to smooth 
their consumption over the life cycle.  In other words our finding that there is no strong 
evidence of widespread under-saving is not inconsistent with a significant share of 
individuals not saving for retirement.  This follows from the critical role played by NZS in 
providing those on low incomes with a standard of living in retirement which matched or 
exceeds that which their pre-retirement incomes can support.  For these people the issue 
is the level of income rather than their level of saving. 
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Saving for Retirement: New 
Evidence for New Zealand  
1 Introduction 
The topic of saving continues to demand widespread attention.  At the aggregate or 
economy wide level there are questions about the rate of saving and its implications for 
investment, long term growth and the sustainability of the external balances a country has 
with the rest of the world.  At the household level there are concerns about the ability of 
households to save for retirement.
1
  These concerns have become heightened globally, as 
populations age (Heller, 2003). 
This paper is concerned solely with the second of these questions: the accumulation of 
retirement wealth by New Zealand households.  Our analysis is based on the findings of 
the Household Savings Survey (HSS).  This survey, conducted in 2001 is the first 
comprehensive view of the assets and liabilities of New Zealand households, and 
provides detailed estimates of the net worth of households.  We can estimate the amount 
that people had accumulated by the time of the survey. As this survey is for one year only 
it does not provide information on the rate of saving as such.
2
  However, based on this 
information we can make an initial attempt to address the question: are New Zealanders 
adequately preparing for retirement?  Given the particular criterion of adequacy that we 
adopt, we find little evidence of widespread under-saving for retirement.  We emphasise 
the important role the New Zealand Superannuation plays in placing a floor under the 
incomes of retirees.  As NZS represents such a significant part of the retirement wealth for 
some 40% of the population, the life cycle approach we adopt in this paper predicts that a 
significant proportion of this group, typically in the lower quintiles of the income 
distribution, would not be expected to reduce their present consumption in order to save 
further for their retirement.  In this sense, the finding from surveys that many 
New Zealanders are not saving for retirement is unsurprising. 
                                                                 
1 See The Treasury (2003). 
2 Information on the assets and liabilities of individuals will be collected in future every two years in the Survey of Family Income and 
Employment (SOFIE).  The sampling for SOFIE will cover all individuals in the household.  In the first instance this will mean that the 
estimates of net worth from Wave 2 of SOFIE will not be strictly comparable to those from the HSS which sampled individuals within a 
selected household.  However once Wave 4 of SOFIE is released, it should  be possible to form more accurate estimates of savings 
rates.  
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2  Adequacy of retirement saving 
2.1 Introduction 
To address this question of whether or not individuals are saving adequately for retirement 
we build on the results of the Household Saving Survey.
3
  The survey covered those over 
18 years old living in private dwellings and usually resident in New Zealand.
4
  The survey 
population covered about 98% of the resident adult population.  For the core sample a 
total of 6,600 households were approached.  One person from those qualifying in the 
household was chosen at random, and information was collected from and about that 
individual.  In the case they had a partner, information was collected for the couple.  In 
order to improve the accuracy of estimates for Maori, a booster sample was used. In total 
the response rate was 74% and the final number in the sample was 5,374 households.  
There were 2,392 individual interviews and 2,982 for couples. It is important to stress that 
the term household refers to the unit of selection.  The results are for individuals (living as 
individuals or partnered) and not for households or families.  
In the next section (2.2) we expand on the concept of adequacy.  We then outline the 
model that we use (2.3) and present the results from the survey (2.4) and the modelling of 
retirement incomes (2.5).  A comparison with the actual saving rates is given in Section 
2.6 while Section 2.7 provides a comparison with some international estimates.   
Conclusions are presented in Section 3. 
2.2  What is meant by adequacy? 
Any attempt to assess how adequately New Zealanders are preparing for retirement 
through saving immediately must confront the question: how is “adequate” to be 
measured?  By what criterion would we assess savings and the associated level of wealth 
accumulation for retirement to be adequate?  What is seen as adequate may differ 
whether we have an individual or a collective perspective.  From a public policy 
perspective we might focus on adequacy as it applies to the average of some group in the 
population; eg, would, on average, those aged between 55-60 with no dependants and 
having accumulated retirement wealth of $20,000 and having current income of $25,000 
be considered to have saved “adequately”?  Or should we recognise that within each 
group there will be wide variation and conclude that adequacy can only be addressed at 
the individual level?  In that case our measure of adequacy might be say, that at least 90 
percent of the group have retirement wealth deemed to be adequate; or perhaps 100%? 
There is a range of measures that one might adopt to measure adequacy. They include: 
(i) Post-retirement income as a proportion of pre-retirement income (typically referred to 
as a replacement rate); 
(ii) Income in retirement should be at least at a level deemed necessary to attain an 
acceptable minimum standard of living (an absolute poverty line approach); 
(iii) Income in retirement should be no lower than say 60 percent of the median income of 
some reference group of retirees (a relative poverty line approach); 
                                                                 
3 No attempt is made to present a full range of results from this survey.  For further details see Statistics New Zealand (2002a and b) 
and Gibson and Scobie (2003). 
4 Those living in non-private dwellings such as institutions, motels, rest homes or hostels were excluded, as were those on offshore 
islands (except Waiheke Island).  
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(iv) Incomes in retirement should be at least equal to some fraction of the average pre-
retirement incomes of the current working population (a variant of a relative measure); 
(v) Incomes in retirement should be at a level that people can sustain their pre-retirement 
level of consumption thereby avoiding a drop in their living standards (a consumption 
smoothing approach); 
(vi) Incomes in retirement should be such that it permits an individual to have the same 
marginal utility of consumption over time (ie, the last unit of consumption has the 
same value to the individual before and after retirement). 
There are undoubtedly other measures that could be proposed.  For example once 
uncertainty is allowed, then we can ask whether an “adequate” retirement income is one 
which would be capable of covering any possible eventuality, such as unanticipated health 
expenses, or extended life expectancy.  Or should it cover say 80% of the expected costs 
of such occurrences?  In the face of planning under uncertainty, one would want to 
consider the role of insurance markets to reduce the costs of uncertainty.  In the absence 
of insurance instruments (either a private policy or a social programme that addresses 
emergency needs or catastrophic events), one might well expect the level of 
precautionary saving to be higher.  In short, the level of uncertainty, an individual’s attitude 
to risk, the cultural patterns of extended family support, the labour force participation 
patterns of the retirees and the scope of private markets and social insurance would all 
shape what we might consider as an “adequate” level of retirement wealth.  Adequacy 
cannot be determined without reference to the social and economic context. 
Clearly, preferences differ widely and that factor alone can help explain a considerable 
amount of the variation in retirement accumulation across individuals.  The fact that wealth 
is typically much more unevenly distributed than income is solid testimony to the fact that 
individuals, similar in all major observable aspects, will choose to accumulate different 
amounts, quite apart from the influence of any windfall gains or losses.  Venti and Wise 
(2000) based on an analysis of households in the USA report: 
…“at all levels of lifetime earnings there is an enormous dispersion in the accumulated 
wealth of families approaching retirement.  We find that very little of this dispersion 
can be explained by chance differences in individual circumstances.  We conclude 
that the bulk of the dispersion must be attributed to differences in the amount that 
households choose to save.  The differences in saving choices among households 
with similar lifetime earnings lead to vastly different levels of asset accumulation by 
the time retirement age approaches”. 
Some individuals will have a more risk averse attitude than others, while some will attach 
different probabilities to possible adverse events.  These differences will influence the 
level of precautionary savings that we observe across individuals.  Both the actual level of 
saving and the “adequate” level of saving will be the resolution of a complex set of factors 
involving the preferences and perceptions of individuals together with their health and 
capabilities, the public policies that are in place, and opportunities in labour markets.  Any 
consideration of adequacy cannot be divorced from these influences.  
We have chosen to approach the matter of retirement income and saving by asking what 
level of post-retirement income could individuals expect to have based on their current 
and projected wealth?  We estimate the saving rates and the replacement rates that are 
implied if individuals attempt to sustain an equal level of consumption before and after 
retirement; ie, we invoke consumption smoothing as the aim of retirement saving.  This 
approach has theoretical appeal and has been widely used in the literature.  In addition  
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we analyse the distribution of the predicted retirement incomes and calculate how many 
people would have incomes in retirement below 60% of the median income of that cohort 
(ie, a relative poverty line approach). 
Housing wealth represents some particular challenges.  In the first place we assume no 
real capital appreciation in housing values; they are simply assumed to remain constant in 
real terms.  This is a conservative assumption that could understate projected retirement 
wealth.  A somewhat typical pattern is for those owning a primary residence to retain this, 
partly as a precautionary investment and partly as a potential bequest.  In such cases it 
would not be appropriate to include the net value of housing assets as part of retirement 
wealth and thereby available to be converted into an annuity along with other accumulated 
assets.  In the empirical analysis we have excluded entirely the value of net worth in 
housing as a source of retirement income.
5
 
2.3  The basic model: jointly determining replacement 
and saving rates
6 
In this section we develop a basic model built on the life cycle approach to consumption 
and saving.
7
  This underpins our use of consumption smoothing as a basis for assessing 
accuracy.  In the absence of uncertainty, the life cycle saving and consumption patterns 
can be simply illustrated as in Figure 1.  Income rises through working life reaching a peak 
(typically at around 55 years) and declining somewhat in later life.  In this simple model 
the household chooses a level of consumption that can be financed from income over the 
working life, and then from savings during retirement.  This implies (ignoring interest for 
the moment) that savings (the area ABC) is equal to consumption needs in retirement 
(depicted as the rectangle CDEF).   
As shown, consumption typically exceeds income during the early years (eg during tertiary 
education) implying the need to finance consumption by borrowing against future income.  
This simple life cycle pattern of income consumption and savings is modified when we 
allow for uncertainty.  As shown by Moore and Mitchell (1997) when life expectancy is 
uncertain consumption will tend to rise until retirement and fall subsequently, rather than 
remaining uniform throughout (see Figure 1, part (b)).  However, the basic pattern of 
earnings and savings reaching a peak prior to retirement and wealth decumulation 
throughout retirement to finance consumption is left unaltered.
8
 
In the case of complete certainty a person may or may not plan to leave a bequest.   
However, in the face of uncertainty, some precautionary savings may be accumulated, 
which if not needed (because of lower than expected costs or premature death) may, by 
default, lead to bequests.  Conversely, if accumulated savings prove inadequate due to 
                                                                 
5 For details of cases allowing for differing amounts of housing equity to enter the estimation of retirement wealth see Scobie and 
Gibson (2003). 
6 The approach adopted follows that of Moore and Mitchell (1997). 
7 Studies such as Bernheim (1992), Engen, Gale and Uccello (2004) and Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun (2004) use a formal 
optimisation approach based on maximising consumer utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint.  We follow Moore and 
Mitchell who note in relation to their choice of a simpler framework: “From a theoretical perspective, this is less appealing than a true 
life cycle-dynamic programming approach as it ignores utility theory and behavioural responses to uncertainty.  However it is a popular 
model among retirement planning practioners and can be seen as a relatively tractable approximation or rule of thumb to the life cycle 
model”.  For a comparison of a utility maximising approach and the model used here see Scobie and Gibson (2003) who find that the 
results from both models are remarkably similar. 
8 For patterns of life-time income, consumption and savings derived from the Household Economic Survey see Gibson and Scobie 
(2001).  Their results show a pattern of lifetime consumption which is captured by the stylised line ACD in Figure 1(b).  
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unforeseen events, some other source of income in retirement would be required (typically 
either from family, the state or charitable agencies). 
Figure 1 – A simple life-cycle model of income, savings and consumption 














Source: Adapted from Moore and Mitchell (1997) 
In the model we apply here we assume there are no sources of uncertainty.
9
  Specifically 
this means that an individual of a given age plans to retire at a certain age (and does so); 
does not engage in the work force after retirement; knows exactly what their income until 
retirement will be; can accurately project the rate of return on investments; has a known 
life expectancy at the age of retirement (and lives for exactly that number of years); knows 
with certainty the amount of NZ Superannuation (NZS) that they will receive; plans and 
executes whatever bequests they wish to make; has no unexpected changes in health 
status that would affect income or expenditures and assumes tax rates and other policies 
                                                                 
9 The incorporation of uncertainty including such sources as sickness, disability, employment, earnings, inheritances and life 
expectancy can best be introduced using micro-simulation models. See for example Statistics Canada (2004). 
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remain unchanged. We further assume that the retirement phase for couples begins when 
the older partner reaches the NZS qualifying age (the younger partner is assumed to 
continue earning an income, which may affect the value of NZS received by the qualifying 
spouse). 
Abstracting from uncertainty has the advantage of significantly simplifying the analysis.  
Clearly the results cannot be interpreted as applying to a particular individual whose 
incomes, expenditures, returns on assets and life expectancy are all subject to shocks.  
However in the case that these shocks are both unanticipated and distributed equally 
among both positive and negative changes, then the outcomes illustrated here can be 
interpreted as expected values for any given population group.  For example, in our 
empirical analysis (Section 2.5) we use life expectancies at retirement age by ethnic group 
and gender.  Other things equal, our results will show the income, saving, wealth and 
consumption levels that could be expected for, say, Māori and Pacific Island women aged 
45-55 as a group, rather than for a specific individual in that group. 
A graphical illustration of the model we apply is given in Figure 2.
10
  At the current time a 
household has a net worth (depicted as Wa) as measured in the HSS.  This is projected to 
grow to an amount denoted Wp by the time they reach a predetermined retirement age 
(here we assume 65).  In order to have a given level of income in retirement they would 
need to have accumulated retirement wealth depicted in Figure 2 as the stock, Wr.  Part of 
their retirement income is provided by NZS.  The stock of wealth at retirement equivalent 
to the flow of income from NZS is incorporated in Wr and Wp. 
The difference between the required wealth (Wr) and the projected wealth Wp is labelled 
as the shortfall and is the amount which would need to be accumulated between now and 
retirement in order to add to the projected stock and hence support an income in 
retirement of level (denoted Yr).  This additional amount, in the absence of inheritances or 
unanticipated windfall gains or losses in asset values, would need to be accumulated 
through savings.  These flows are depicted in Figure 2(b). 
The approach assumes that some fixed share s  of pre-retirement income will be saved 
(s=S/Yp) and the replacement rate (R) is given by the ratio of gross income in retirement 
to gross income pre-retirement (ie, R= Yr/Yp).  Under the New Zealand taxation system of 
TTE, post retirement taxes (denoted as Tr) are assumed to be zero, so real after tax 
consumption is equal to total pre-retirement income.
11
 
Clearly some values of retirement income could imply a substantial shortfall in retirement 
wealth, which might in turn require unrealistic or unfeasible levels of saving pre-retirement.  
It is for this reason that the saving and replacement rates are jointly determined. 
A number of additional factors arise which are not depicted in Figure 2.  Instead of a 
constant pre-retirement income we assume that income grows from its actual level (as 
observed in the survey) by a fixed annual growth rate of 1% chosen to approximate the 
average annual rate of labour productivity and real wage growth in the economy.  The 
gross income at retirement (Yp) is then based on the observed actual earnings plus a 
                                                                 
10 A complete derivation of the model is given in Scobie and Gibson (2003). 
11 In the context of the New Zealand system of taxation, private retirement saving is made from after-tax pre-retirement income and the 
earnings on the investments are taxed.  However, once those accumulated funds are withdrawn (in this case to purchase an annuity) 
then there is no further taxation payable by the recipient; taxes on earnings are paid by the seller.  Furthermore, New Zealand 
Superannuation payments are received net of tax.  Hence under this system (denoted TTE) we have assumed for the purpose of the 
modelling that there is no post-retirement taxation (ie tr = 0).  
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compound growth of 1% annually.
12
  Pre-retirement tax rates are based on pre-retirement 
real income (Yp). NZS payments are assumed to grow at 1% annually in real terms, 
matching the growth in average real wages.  Bequests involve only the current equity in 
the principal residence and uncertainty is removed by assuming individuals predict their 
life expectancies. 
Figure 2 – A stylised view of stocks and flows of income, savings and retirement 



















                                                                 
12 An alternative approach would have been to estimate age earnings profiles for the survey.  However, with a single cross section as 
in the HSS one cannot isolate cohort effects as these would have been compounded into earnings estimates.  There are a number of 
individuals in the sample who report negative or very low incomes.  These reported incomes could include a significant transitory 
component, such as a temporarily low income due to redundancy or losses in an unincorporated business. Some estimate of 
consumption is often used in such cases as a better proxy for permanent income.  In this study we use the unemployment benefit rate 
as an estimate of a minimum consumption level for those reporting negative incomes or income below the benefit rate. 
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2.4  Some basic results from the survey 
This section presents some summary results from the HSS.  Total net wealth as 
measured by the HSS has been grouped into four elements. 
a.  Net Housing Wealth: based on the reported housing equity at the time of the 
survey. 
b.  Net Financial Wealth: includes all property other than the primary residence, 
shares, trusts, farms, businesses, motor vehicles, cash, bank deposits and 
collectibles net of all liabilities (credit cards, bank loans, student loans, etc). 
c. Pension  Wealth:  the value of all pension schemes held at the time of the survey. 
d. Superannuation  Wealth:  the present value of the future stream of payments from 
New Zealand Superannuation (NZS) assuming that current levels of payments and 
eligibility criteria apply. 
No allowance is included for human capital.  Gibson and Scobie (2003) have shown that 
when human capital estimates are included in net wealth the level and pattern change 
significantly,  with a very marked reduction in the inequality of the wealth distribution. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the results for couples.
13
 Several points are noteworthy.  
First, NZS represents a very significant part of retirement accumulation for all age groups. 
Second, housing equity only represents about one quarter of wealth excluding NZS, and 
15 percent of overall mean wealth when NZS is included.  Third, while these results are 
based on means, the distribution of wealth is skewed to the higher end. For example the 
top 20% of couples aged 45-55 hold over 40% of the total wealth of that age group. 
Because of this inequality in the distribution, it is useful to consider the median as well as 
the mean values.  The overall median levels for couples across all age groups are shown 
in the last row of Table 1. 










Wealth  Total Wealth 
25-34 32,263  81,930  13,546 233,692 361,431 
35-44 73,130  176,055  19,918 259,935 529,038 
45-55 109,456  267,043  31,973 290,039 698,511 
56-64 127,506  292,028  46,298 323,766 789,597 
Total 85,502  205,187  26,982 275,075 592,747 
Overall Median  36,000  51,350  0 270,414 446,786 
Note: A couple is assigned to an age group based on the age of the older partner at the time of the survey. 
Table 2 provides estimates by quintile of current income.  The fact that the median total 
wealth for the lowest three quintiles (ie 60%) is similar despite wide differences in the non-
NZS components of wealth is indicative of the equalising effect of NZS.  A major 
                                                                 
13 A complete summary of current and projected retirement wealth for couples and unpartnered individuals is given in Appendix Tables 
1 and 2.  
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difference arises from the financial wealth of the highest 20% of the income distribution, 
resulting in significantly greater total median wealth for this group. 
Table 2 – Median values and composition of current wealth by income quintile for 





Wealth  Pension Wealth 
Superannuation 
Wealth  Total Wealth 
1=poorest  0  11,500  0 287,507 377,317 
2  27,000  24,700  0 267,120 384,346 
3  55,000  38,955  0 267,519 428,215 
4  45,000  77,860  0 269,682 531,131 
5=richest  82,000 194,549  0 269,442 701,689 
Total  36,000  51,350  0 270,414 446,786 
2.5  Results from the model 
Table 3 presents the projected wealth levels at retirement (age 65). These projections 
(corresponding to Wp in Figure 2) are based on the levels of reported wealth, including 
housing wealth, at the time of the survey.
14
  Again, it is helpful to consider the median 
values.  An important conclusion is that the projected wealth accumulated by age 65 is 
similar for all age groups.  Although the younger age groups typically have a lower current 
level of wealth, the fact that they have a longer period until retirement for that wealth to 
grow means their projected wealth by the time they retire turns out to be remarkably 
similar to those close to retirement. 
Table 3 – Mean and median values of projected wealth at retirement by age group: 
in 2001$  
Couples Unpartnered  Individuals 
Age Group  Mean  Median  Mean Median 
25-34  659,847  526,409  314,991 287,496 
35-44  782,549  616,447  423,007 307,371 
45-55  863,158  684,146  448,780 347,413 
56-64  853,473  667,842  453,084 372,560 
Total  794,607  607,687  394,777 310,100 
While the projected levels of retirement wealth are similar across age groups, this is 
based solely on the growth in the real value of existing net assets.  It does not reflect the 
fact that real incomes will grow - and the longer until retirement the more potential there is 
to have saved out of rising lifetime real incomes.  As a result, we find that the projected 
median retirement incomes for couples by age group (all in $2001) are: 
• 25-34:  $45,565 
• 35-44:  $46,141 
• 45-55:  $38,872 
• 56-64:  $29,465 
                                                                 
14 Details of the methods are given in Scobie and Gibson (2003).  
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It is evident that when measured in constant 2001 terms, the real retirement income of the 
youngest age groups will be over 50% higher than that of the oldest cohort retiring over 
the next decade.  At first glance this may seem inconsistent with the fact that the projected 
real levels of retirement wealth are comparable.  However, there is nothing surprising in 
this result when it is recalled that the projections incorporate a real annual growth rate in 
incomes and NZS of 1%.  Steady growth rates, even at modest annual levels, imply a 
significantly higher real income in future decades, parallel to the real incomes that people 
today enjoy compared to the real incomes of their grandparents.
15
  
The next step is to estimate the average annual (constant) saving rate that would be 
required in order to achieve consumption smoothing.  These saving rates are denoted 
“prescribed”. At the same time the replacement rate can be derived. These results are 
summarised in Table 4.   
Table 4 – Mean and median values of prescribed saving rates (percentages) and 
corresponding replacement rates (percentages) to achieve consumption 
smoothing: by age group: 2001 
Couples Unpartnered  Individuals 
Prescribed Saving Rate  Replacement Rate  Prescribed Saving Rate  Replacement Rate 
Age 
Group 
Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
25-34  8.1  10.9 63.6 64.3 1.0  5.0  71.2 72.4 
35-44  9.9  13.8 60.3 56.8 0.6  7.8  70.5 66.6 
45-55  6.0  18.2 66.0 54.3 -5.4 4.0  78.1 69.1 
56-64  1.6  14.9 72.9 60.4 -27.8  -13.9  103.8  90.9 
Total  6.9  13.5 65.0 57.4 -4.6 4.9  77.1 71.4 
Note: The prescribed saving rate is that rate (as a percentage of before tax pre-retirement income) which would be required for a 
couple or individual to meet the definition of adequacy used in the model; ie to allow consumption smoothing, given their current 
wealth as measured in the survey.  The replacement rate is the ratio of post to pre-retirement income (ie, R= Yr/Yp).  Some 
individuals have such high levels of wealth accumulated already that, given their incomes, they would be able to smooth 
consumption with no further saving - in fact the model gives the result that they could "dissave" and run down current wealth (ie 
s<0). As a result it is possible in these circumstances that Yr can exceed Yp (ie R>1). 
When the results are further disaggregated it is found that those with high wealth and 
those with low incomes tend to have negative rates of prescribed saving.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 3 for couples aged 45-55 planning to retire at age 65.  This can be 
interpreted that for those people, in order to smooth consumption no further saving is 
required.  In the case of high wealth couples, this simply means that they already have 
accumulated sufficient wealth to sustain consumption given their reported incomes.  
Of note is the fact that median prescribed rate of those in the lowest income quintile is 
also negative.  This arises because NZS offers them an income in retirement that is 
comparable to or higher than that which they have pre-retirement.  In such a case, they 
would be disinclined to save further now. 
                                                                 
15 For an analysis of real consumption trends for the New Zealand economy see Guest, Bryant and Scobie (2003).  
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Figure 3 – Median prescribed saving rates for couples aged 45-55 retiring at age 65 



































Note: Quintiles of either income or wealth are shown on the horizontal axis 
The saving rates in Table 4 are derived from a model, which has as its starting point the 
assumption that people save for retirement at a rate which would allow them to have the 
same standard of living (as measured by real consumption) in retirement that they had 
pre-retirement.  Clearly there are many other rules for saving adequacy that could have 
been applied.  How well do these prescribed rates match the rates at which people 
actually save?  This comparison is presented in the next section. 
2.6  A comparison with actual saving rates 
In this paper we have estimated the rates of saving that we have defined as prescribed 
rates.  These rates are those which, if people’s saving behaviour was governed by a 
desire to smooth consumption over their lifetimes, would be consistent with that objective.  
Of course, modelling behaviour requires us to formulate a theory of how we think people 
behave with respect to savings and consumption now versus later.  It is impossible to 
know for certain if the proposed theory is really how people behave.  Often, evidence of a 
counter example will be used to imply that the theory cannot be valid.  Some individuals 
might appear to behave in a way quite counter to that which the theory of savings would 
predict. 
Theoretical models do not, however, try or pretend to predict the behaviour of every 
individual.  They are by their very nature abstractions from the complexity of real world 
observations; were they not they would cease to be useful constructs.  We do not claim 
that people actually behave in the way set out in the model and accumulate wealth 
converting the stock of all assets to an annuity at retirement.  The question is whether the 
outcomes of such models are consistent with observed behaviour.  In other words, are 
people acting as if they were endeavouring to smooth consumption over their lifetimes?  
The most powerful test of the underlying theory we have proposed about savings 
behaviour is whether or not it is capable of predicting how people actually behave.  
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In order to conduct the comparison we need data on actual savings behaviour.   
Unfortunately there are no surveys in New Zealand which have been designed to 
measure savings at individual household level.  This represents an important limitation.  
We have used the Household Economic Survey (HES) as our source in the absence of 
any better measures.
16
   
From that survey we were able to derive estimates of the ratio of household saving to 
disposable income by quintile of disposable income. We then adjusted these to ratios of 
savings to pre-tax (gross) income, using the relevant tax rates.
17
  The results apply to 
couples rather than unpartnered individuals for whom it was not feasible to extract 
estimated saving rates from the HES. 
Included in the data on consumption used to derive the measure of saving (defined as 
income less consumption expenditure) is expenditure on durables.  The appropriate 
treatment of durables is to remove them from current consumption on the grounds that 
they provide a flow of services extending over years, in contrast to consumables which 
are fully used in the current year.  One then calculates an annual charge (known as the 
user cost of capital) which allows for changes in valuation, interest on the capital and 
depreciation.  This is then added back to expenditure to reflect annual costs of ownership.  
In the case of the HES it was not possible to construct a complete inventory and hence a 
true user cost of durables.  In our base case we chose to exclude durable expenditures, 
which will understate the true costs of ownership by the amount of the user costs.  It is 
argued that this is preferable to including all durables and overstating current consumption 
spending.  Clearly the true value lies between these extremes, and we address this issue 
with sensitivity tests below.   
The argument for excluding durables expenditure rests on the premise that these articles 
provide a flow of services over time.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that people often 
replace these articles in the years leading up to retirement.  If this were the case, then it 
would reinforce the argument that these items represent a form of saving.  To test this 
proposition we examined the levels of spending on durables recorded in the HES.  We 
compared the mean and median levels of expenditure for those in the pre-retirement age 
group (55-64) with those in the first decade of retirement (ages 65-74).
18
  The results are 
summarised in the Table 5.   
                                                                 
16 See Gibson and Scobie (2001). It must be stressed that this survey was not designed to measure saving rates, although they can be 
derived from the income and expenditure data.  Statistics New Zealand has noted this caveat (see Household Economic Survey, 
Background Notes 1996-97, p.17).  There are two reasons for this. In the first place, savings, as a residual between two large numbers 
each with large sampling errors, is itself likely to be measured with large sampling errors.  Second, some parts of annual expenditure 
are estimated by multiplying by 26 the expenditure information recorded by diary for a household for a 2 week period.  The actual 
annual savings will not necessarily be equal to the difference between income and this estimated expenditure.  In some cases it will 
over estimate savings and in others underestimate the actual amount of savings.  However as we are only concerned with the pattern 
of saving for broad groups and do not attempt to report results for individuals, this latter problem should be minimised.  It remains true 
however that the estimates will be subject to a margin of error.  For examples of estimating saving as the difference between income 
and consumption see Attanasio (1998), Paxson (1996) and Deaton and Paxson (2000).  It should be further noted that the rising trends 
in household saving which are found in the HES do not accord with the falling trends from the national accounts measures. For a 
comparison see Claus and Scobie (2002). 
17 From the HES we obtained S/Yd where Yd is disposable income. Now S/ Yp =(S/Yd))*( Yd/ Yp).  However, as ( Yd/ Yp) =(Yp -Tp)/ Yp = 
1-tp where Tp is total pre-retirement taxes and tp the rate of personal income tax applicable to the particular income level, then S/ Yp 
=(S/Yd))*(1-tp).   
18 The ages refer to the head of the household.  
WP 04/12 |  SAVING FOR RETIREMENT:  
NEW EVIDENCE FOR NEW ZEALAND 
13
 
Table 5 - Mean and median household expenditures on durables pre- and post- 
retirement by age of the head of household and selected years 
 55-64 65-74 
Year  Mean Median  Mean Median 
1996-97 5,500  1,300  3,400  650 
1997-98 3,800  1,300  2,900  570 
2000-01 3,800  1,000  2,900  550 
Source: Computed from the Household Economic Survey. 
Median spending on durables falls by about one half in the first decade of retirement.  
These findings are consistent with the proposition that durable spending is undertaken, 
like any form of saving, to provide a flow of services in years beyond the year of purchase. 
The results for the medians for the prescribed and actual saving rates are summarised in 
Table 6, for both including and excluding durables as part of consumption spending.   
When durables are excluded, the median actual saving rate (estimated from the HES) 
exceeds the prescribed rate for the population as a whole.  In fact the actual rates 
excluding durables are greater than the prescribed rates for every age cohort.  This 
implies that individuals are actually saving at a rate which would allow them to meet the 
somewhat stringent test of sustaining pre-retirement consumption that we have applied.   
Table 6 – Median values of saving rates (as percentages of gross income) from the 
HES compared with the prescribed rates for couples from the HSS: 2001 












25-34  10.9 11.3  4.4 
35-44  13.8 14.4  9.0 
45-55  18.2 17.4 10.4 
56-64  14.9 18.7 13.2 
Total  13.5 15.5  8.7 
Note: The age category is based on the older of the couple in the HSS analysis, while the HES is defined as the age of the head of the 
household. 
Figure 4 presents the results broken down by income quintile within each of the four age 
groups.  For the poorest quintile of the two older age groups, the model prescribed saving 
rates that were negative and in fact that is exactly what is observed.  For the top three 
quintiles the prescribed rates are quite comparable to the actual rates in almost all age 
cohorts.
19
 It is the bottom 40% of those in the age range 25-44 who appear to have made 
insufficient provision for their retirement.  But this is not particularly worrying, since these  
 
                                                                 
19 Throughout the study income tax rates are set at the schedule currently prevailing.  In order to meet the increased costs of NZS as 
the population ages, a number of strategies could be followed.  To the extent that these might involve an increase in tax rates to fund 
the pay-as-you-go portion of NZS, this has not been allowed for in this study.    
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Figure 4 – Median prescribed saving rates compared to actual saving rates from the 
Household Economic Survey (HES) for couples by age groups and 5 quintiles of 
income: 2001with durables excluded from consumption 
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people, many of whom have just started their career, still have a long working time to 
adjust their saving behaviour appropriately.  
It is important to stress that the comparisons are not for exactly the same individuals.  We 
have taken those in a particular age group from the HES and compared their actual 
saving rates with the mean and median rates for the similar age group from the HSS.  
Furthermore as we have only compared medians, it is possible that there is a tail of the 
distribution that is not saving “adequately” even though the median for their age group is 
below the actual rate.  In other words, these results do not pretend to make the case that 
“every individual is saving adequately”.  There will be those who will find that their savings 
will not be sufficient to sustain their pre-retirement living standards (“grasshoppers”) at 
one end, and at the other those who have saved enough or even more than was 
necessary (the “squirrels”).   
We have previously discussed the treatment of durable expenditures, arguing that their 
exclusion from current consumption is consistent with the concept they supply a flow of 
services over a number of years.  We also showed evidence on durables expenditure  
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which was consistent with that which would be predicted if indeed there are intertemporal 
transfers made through durables; ie they have a savings element.  We noted that in the 
absence of data to compute an annual user cost of capital, the theoretically appropriate 
strategy to address this issue, we had excluded durables from consumption expenditure 
when making estimates of the saving rate, acknowledging that this was an approximation. 
A well known problem in the estimation of saving rates arise from the fact that savings is 
typically a small residual found as the difference between two much larger numbers, 
income and expenditure.  For example suppose income were 100 and consumption 96, so 
that as a share of income the saving rate would be 4%.  Now suppose durable spending 
of 2 were removed from the consumption spending so that the resultant estimate of the 
saving rate would now be 6%; ie, a small change in consumption spending, while not of 
major significance in absolute terms, can lead to a  marked change in the derived saving 
rates.  In short, while the absolute magnitudes might be quite small slight changes can 
lead to marked swings in the estimate of the savings rate. 
A legitimate question arises as to the impact of our treatment of durables.  What would the 
actual saving rates computed from the HES have been had we retained all expenditure on 
durables as part of consumption spending?  We recomputed the actual saving rates under 
this extreme assumption; the results are shown in the last column of Table 6).  As a result 
of counting all durables as current consumption, the estimated median actual saving rate 
for all individuals falls substantially from 15.5% to 8.7%, and is now below the prescribed 
rate. 
It is informative however to consider the breakdown by age groups.  The most dramatic 
reductions are in the younger age groups.  This is not unexpected as savings are typically 
low during this stage of the lifecycle and hence any slight adjustments to the absolute 
numbers will have a dramatic effect of the rates as observed.  If we focus on the oldest 
group, those approaching retirement, then we find that the effect on the estimated actual 
median saving rate is much less marked, and the actual and prescribed rates remain 
similar.  It must be stressed that the median expenditure on durables for this age group 
was $1,000 in 2001 (Table 5) so that whether we include or exclude durables will have a 
limited effect on the absolute amount of saving required to achieve consumption 
smoothing despite the fact that it does alter the measured rate of saving. 
To this point we have been comparing the prescribed rates with actual rate estimated from 
a single year of the HES.  The prescribed rates are the annual average saving rates that 
would be required over the remainder of the working life to generate a stock of wealth by 
retirement that would provide an income sufficient to maintain pre-retirement 
consumption. 
A more comprehensive way to make the comparison would be to estimate actual saving 
rates over the remainder of the working life.  This was accomplished for two selected 
cohorts by forecasting the savings rates from regressions by age cohorts based on the 
pattern of saving by age reported in Gibson and Scobie (2001).  A set of conditioning 
variables were included in the regressions to allow for the effect of house tenure, income, 
gender, ethnicity and employment type.  The mean values of these for the respective 
cohort were assigned when making forecasts.  For example the cohort born between 
1930 and 1939 were on average 56 years old in the years covered by the HES.  We used 
the corresponding regression equation for the actual saving rate to forecast saving rates 
for each year of age from 56 to the specified retirement age of 65.  The results are 
summarised in Table 7.  
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Table 7 – A comparison of the prescribed saving rates with actual rates predicted 
from the Household Economic Survey by age cohorts over the years 
remaining to retirement 
Actual Saving Rates   
 
Age Cohort 
 Prescribed  Saving 







With durables included 
as consumption 
(%) 
Mean 3.8  24.6  18.1  Cohort born 1930-
1939a 
Median 16.6c 18.6 9.9 
Mean 8.0  26.6  21.4  Cohort born 1940-
1949b 
Median 16.0d 20.6 14.6 
Notes: 
a. Average age of this cohort over the years covered by the HES was 56. 
b. Average age of this cohort over the years covered by the HES was 46. 
c. Computed as the average of the prescribed rates for the age groups 45-55 and 56-64 from Table 6. 
d. Computed as the average of the prescribed rates for the age groups 35-44 and 45-55 from Table 6. 
For both cohorts examined, those born 1930-39 and 1940-49, the actual rates of saving 
exceed the prescribed rates for achieving consumption smoothing when durables are 
excluded from consumption.  When we include durables as consumption spending, the 
actual median rates fall below the prescribed median rates.  However the mean rates 
remain above the prescribed rates.  In other words regardless of how durables are 
treated, the average rates of saving across these two cohorts exceeds the rate necessary 
to maintain consumption levels in retirement. 
We have been conservative in requiring full consumption benefits to the surviving partner 
and maintaining consumption throughout retirement when typically consumption needs 
fall.  If we were to relax these assumptions it is almost certain that even the median rates 
would then be sufficient to meet the lower prescribed rates. 
The results to this point have suggested that the preferred strategy for some groups is to 
make no additional provision for retirement from their current income.  This arises either 
because they have high levels of wealth relative to income, or have low levels of pre-
retirement income relative to the income expected from NZS.  In either case, they would 
be able to achieve a level of consumption in retirement that matched their pre-retirement 
consumption level (ie consumption smoothing) with no further saving.  How many people 
are in these categories? To address this we estimated the proportion of all couples or 
unpartnered individuals for whom the prescribed saving rates are negative.  The results, 
grouped by age and income quintile, are summarised in Table 8. 
Table 8 reveals some striking results.  Consider first the overall proportions.  Some 17% 
of couples and 38% of individuals have a prescribed saving rate which was negative.  It is 
important that the correct interpretation of this result be made.  Technically it means that 
those people could actually consume some of their current wealth, and use this to even 
out their consumption over the lifetime.  However, in the case of low income households, 
much of their retirement wealth is represented by the value of NZS, and clearly borrowing 
against that future income stream is not feasible.  Rather a negative saving rate should be 
interpreted as a signal that if consumption smoothing is indeed the underlying behavioural  
WP 04/12 |  SAVING FOR RETIREMENT:  
NEW EVIDENCE FOR NEW ZEALAND 
17
 
model of retirement savings, then no further saving would be indicated.  Combining 
unpartnered individuals and couples, the overall share of all individuals for whom no 
further saving would be optimal is 24 percent.  In short we would not expect up to one 
quarter of the population to be making additional saving for their own retirement over and 
above that which they have already accumulated.
20
 
Table 8 – Proportion of couples and individuals retiring at age 65 for whom the 
prescribed saving rate is negative: 2001 
Couples Unpartnered  Individuals  Income 
Quintile  25-34 35-44 45-55 56-64 Total  25-34 35-44 45-55 56-64 Total 
1  35.4 43.0 60.8 64.5 52.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2  3.9  9.7 12.0 22.2 10.6 54.0 49.2 56.3 85.3 58.1 
3  3.9 5.1 7.3 8.2 6.0 1.4 4.0 9.8  19.8 5.8 
4  4.1  8.2 10.0 17.2  9.4 4.5 8.4 7.0  31.3 9.6 
5  4.3  4.2 10.0 16.4  8.0  3.6 17.9 18.3 40.1 15.6 
Total  10.7 12.0 18.5 31.8 17.2 33.5 30.2 36.8 66.3 37.9 
Note: A negative saving rate is interpreted as meaning that to a achieve an adequate retirement income (defined as the ability to 
maintain pre-retirement consumption levels) then given current and projected levels of wealth and income, no further saving 
would be required. 
We can compare this finding with the survey results reported by Weiss and Drillien (2003) 
who find that almost 50% of those interviewed are not saving for retirement.  Our results 
predict that at there are sound reasons to expect at least half this number have rational 
reasons not to be saving for retirement.   
There are two reasons for this.  As illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, the prescribed saving 
rates are typically negative in the lowest income group and the highest wealth group.  A 
low present income relative to the expected retirement income which NZS offers under 
current policies means that the preferred savings strategy is not to reduce present 
consumption further from the low income.  Equally those with high current wealth (typically 
having high incomes) have no need to save additional amounts.  Their existing wealth 
would be sufficient to provide a retirement income which smoothed their lifetime 
consumption.  
How many of those for whom additional saving is not the preferred strategy to achieve 
consumption smoothing come from the low income groups whose primary source of 
retirement income is NZS?  Among couples 73% and among unpartnered individuals 
some 84% of those with negative prescribed saving rates are from the lowest 40% of the 
income distribution.  In the case of unpartnered individuals in the lowest income quintile, 
100% of every age group has a negative prescribed rate; based on a consumption 
smoothing model, we would not expect any of this group to be making additional 
retirement savings. 
To explore this distributional aspect further we have computed the predicted retirement 
incomes of couples by age and income quintile and compared these to an income level 
represented by 60 percent of the median predicted retirement income.  This level is 
sometimes used as poverty line.  The results are presented in Figure 5.  Those whose 
                                                                 
20 This average is computed as the weighted average of the results for couples and individuals based on the population numbers of 
930,900 unpartnered individuals and 1,711,800 individuals in couples (Statistics New Zealand 2002, Table 1.01, p.24).  
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medians fall below the overall poverty line are aged 56-64 and in the lower two income 
quintiles. 
Figure 5 – Median predicted retirement income for couples retiring at 65 by income 




































Aged 25-34 Aged 35-44 Aged 45-55 Aged 55-64 60% of the Overall Median
  
Finally we can ask: what proportion in each group has a projected retirement income level 
which falls below the poverty line?  These results are summarised by age and ethnicity in 
Table 9. 
Table 9 – Percentage of couples in each age group falling below 60 percent of the 
overall median predicted level of retirement income 
Age Group  Pakeha  Maori & Pacific 
Is. 
Total  Total share falling 
below the poverty line 
for their age group 
25-34 3.1  16.6  7.9  10.8 
35-44 3.5  12.9  6.3  10.1 
45-55  6.6 30.4 10.1  8.0 
56-64  34.2 66.4 39.6  9.5 
Total  10.3 26.0 13.7  9.5 
Note: Ethnicity of a couple refers to that of the respondent. 
The results show that a greater proportion of the Maori and Pacific Island population have 
predicted incomes below 60 percent of the overall median; this is especially marked for 
the oldest age group. 
It must be recalled however that NZS provides a floor under the retirement income, so 
while there a significant share of the population falling below the poverty line, the actual 
gap in dollar terms is quite small. This is illustrated in Figure 6. 
For the purposes of illustration we have taken the total population of couples aged 56-64.  
The mean and median predicted retirement income of this group is $38,253 and $29,465  
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respectively, again emphasising the skewness of these distributions.  Of this group, 9.5% 
were predicted to have incomes below the value corresponding to 60% of the median for 
their group; ie, below $17,679.
21
  However NZS places a floor on the retirement income of 
a couple of $19,100 so that in effect no retirees fall below 60% of the median retirement 
income for this group. 
Two points emerge from this analysis. The first is that some 32% of this older age group is 
projected to have no other savings for retirement, and would therefore rely solely on NZS.  
Note however, that where their pre-retirement incomes are low, then their behaviour is still 
consistent with wishing to smooth their consumption.  It is true that additional pre-
retirement saving would provide them with a higher income in retirement– but that would 
come at the expense of reducing their already low level of pre-retirement consumption.   
Figure 6 – Distribution of predicted retirement incomes for couples aged 56-64, 










This finding mirrors recent results for the USA. Engen, Gale and Uccello (2004) use a 
model for estimating optimal wealth accumulation which, like the present study, is based 
on a measure of consumption smoothing.  Unlike the present study however, it allows for 
uncertainty in life-time earnings.  They compare the optimal level of lifetime wealth 
accumulation derived from the model with the actual levels of reported wealth 
accumulation. They report that while some people have very low levels of wealth 
accumulation this is completely consistent with rational behaviour. 
“The low level of wealth accumulation exhibited by a significant minority of households 
in the simulation model is consistent with optimizing behaviour and in no way implies a 
retirement saving shortfall owing to myopia, irrationality, or poor information”. (p.10) 
The second point is that almost 10% of retired couples would have projected retirement 
incomes below 60% of the median retirement income
22
 for this age cohort in the absence 
                                                                 
21 Given that the poverty line defined as 60% of the median income is $17,679 and NZS payment $19,100, the question arises as to 
why 9.5% should appear to fall below the poverty line.  This arises because some people have negative net worth, which makes their 
total current wealth lower than that from NZS alone. So when that stock of wealth is converted into a flow of income, the incomes they 
would receive in retirement will be lower than NZS payment.  In effect, income from NZS is needed to pay off debts existing at the time 
of retirement.
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of NZS.  However, once NZS is allowed for, these couples receive an income from NZS 
that is above the so-called poverty line by some 8% ($19,100 compared to $17,679).  In 
other words, it would appear that payments under NZS are in fact set to provide an 
income slightly above the basic minimum standard of living for retirees. 
It is worth noting however that the Survey of Living Standards of Older New Zealanders 
(2001) reports that: 
Overall, the results show that most older people were doing relatively well, with any 
restrictions relating to more “luxury” oriented items ….A preliminary comparison 
across the total population showed that older people tended to report fewer material 
restrictions and difficulties than younger people with this trend holding for both Maori 
and non-Maori respondents. 
Living Standards of Older New Zealanders: A Technical Account, p.13 
This finding suggests that the level of NZS does appreciably limit deprivation among older 
people and that the findings that people are saving adequately for retirement is consistent 
with the fact that little deprivation amongst retirees is found.
23
 
2.7 International  comparisons 
The findings of this study are consistent with recent studies for the USA and the UK.  In 
Table 10 we compare the results of the present study with two studies for the USA.  The 
results of all three studies are remarkably similar.  In all cases the prescribed saving level 
for the lowest income group is either close to zero or negative.  The rate rises with income 
and reaches similar levels across all studies for the highest income group.   
The uniformly low level of saving prescribed for the low income group is a reflection of the 
public provision of retirement income.  Bernheim et al. (2000) observe: 
“The fact that the recommended saving rate is close to zero for the low income group 
and that the rate rises with income is not surprising.  Most of the low-income 
households will receive the majority of their post-retirement incomes from Social 
Security. And the higher the level of income, the smaller the fraction of pre-retirement 
income being replaced by Social Security”.  
which is consistent with the findings of this study for New Zealand.  The argument that 
compulsory pension schemes result in a substitution for other forms of saving receives 
additional support from the work of Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003).  They examine 
household saving in the UK and conclude that the state earnings related pension scheme 
(SERPS) results in a significant substitution for financial wealth.
24
  In other words those 
who had built up pension wealth in the obligatory SERPS scheme accumulated less in 
other forms of wealth, a result they note “is in accordance with the basic prediction of the 
life cycle model” (p.1515). 
                                                                 
23 A caveat is that the comparison here is strictly between those who were retired and those who are nearing retirement.  In other 
words these refer to different cohorts and to address the question of whether a particular cohort reached retirement and felt their living 
standards were satisfactory would require longitudinal panel data which does not exist.  
24 They find that a 10% increase in pension wealth through SERPS is accompanied by a reduction of between 6.5 and 7.5% in the 
financial wealth of 55-64 year olds.  
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Table 10 – Median prescribed saving rates (%): a comparison with USA results 
USA 
Bernheim et al (2000)  Moore and Mitchell (1997) 




50-55 56-61  51-61  45-55  56-64 
Low 1  0  Negative  Negative  Negative 
Lower Middle  13  17  3  20.8  12.6 
Upper Middle  14  20  9  17.4  20.3 
High 17  23  17  19.3 25.9 
Note: The income categories are based on deciles: Low = 1; Lower Middle = 3 and 4; Upper Middle = 6 and 7, and High = 10. For the 
New Zealand results from this study the data are drawn from quintiles where: Low = 1; Lower Middle = 2; Upper Middle = 4, and 
High = 5. 
Sources: Bernheim, Forni, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (2000) Table 1, p.290); Moore and Mitchell (1997), Table 3, p.33. 
In a related study Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) present similar evidence for Italy. Their 
paper provides new evidence on the substitutability between private and pension wealth 
by exploiting the Italian pension reform of 1992. They find convincing evidence that saving 
rates increase as a result of a reduction in pension wealth. By allowing for the possibility 
that substitutability changes with age, they find that substitutability is particularly high (and 
precisely estimated) for workers between 35 and 45. 
A recent study by Scholz et al (2004) for the USA, asks whether Americans are saving 
“optimally” for retirement.  They use a life cycle model but incorporate uncertain life 
expectancies, taxation and transfers, pension benefits and uninsurable earnings and 
medical expenses.  Their model is able to explain over 80% of the cross sectional 
variation in retirement wealth accumulation and they argue that the results provide strong 
support for the life cycle model.  The life cycle model does a much better job of explaining 
retirement accumulations than simply assuming that households save a given fraction of 
their income (depending on age and income).  They find that there is “strikingly little 
evidence that HRS households have undersaved”.  They conclude: 
“The results, based on data from the Health and Retirement Study, are striking… We 
find that the model is capable of accounting for more than 80 percent of the 1992 
cross-sectional variation in wealth. Fewer than 20 percent of households have less 
wealth than their optimal targets, and the wealth deficit of those who are under saving 
is generally small”. 
Engen, Gale and Uccello (2004) use a simulation model of optimal wealth accumulation 
for retirement that is based on consumption smoothing.
25
  An important feature of their 
work is that it allows for precautionary savings in the face of uncertain future earnings.  A 
second innovation in their work is the use of lifetime earnings rather than current earnings.  
In the present study we have been restricted to using current earnings, as no data were 
available for lifetime earnings to date of individuals in the sample of the HSS.  Current 
earnings may well reflect a transitory component so for example an observed low level of 
earnings in the survey year may understate the life time earnings level of the individual.  
This could result in the level of savings and retirement wealth being underestimated, and 
creating an impression of adequacy of saving based on a transitory rather than a 
permanent measure of earnings.  
                                                                 
25 Their model holds the marginal utility of consumption constant rather than the level of consumption as in the present study.  A 
comparison of the two approaches is given in Scobie and Gibson (2003).  
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The authors find that households at the median level of wealth to lifetime earnings are 
saving as much or more than the optimal needed for consumption smoothing.  At the high 
wealth end of the distribution, actual saving rates are significantly greater than the optimal 
level, but among the lowest 25 percent of the population there was undersaving. 
These results are very similar to the case of New Zealand reported in this study.  However 
because of the role played by NZS, undersaving appears to occur more in the second to 
lowest quintile of the income distribution than in the lowest group.  Engen, Gale and 
Uccello also stress that any reduction in Social Security benefits “could have significant 
deleterious effects on the adequacy of saving especially among low-income households”.  
The implication is that like the case of NZS, Social Security represents the principal if not 
only source of retirement income for many low income households, and their retirement 
savings have been heavily influenced by the expectation of receiving these payments.  
Any changes would seriously disadvantage this group of households. 
3 Conclusions 
This paper has focussed on the accumulation by New Zealand households for retirement.  
The question addressed in the paper is as follows: based on the results of the Household 
Savings Survey, what can be said about how adequately New Zealanders are saving for 
retirement?  To answer this question one must establish some criterion of adequacy.   
There are many candidates, but this paper uses a life cycle approach and posits that 
retirement savings are undertaken in order to smooth lifetime consumption.  Using a 
model derived from this premise, and based on the observed wealth accumulations at the 
time of the survey, we are able to estimate for individuals and couples the rate of saving 
they would need to achieve an “adequate” retirement income.  By comparing this rate with 
independent estimates of saving rates from the Household Economic Survey, we are able 
to offer a tentative conclusion on the question of adequacy.  Our results are based on the 
assumption that current NZS policies will be maintained in the future.  Other critical 
assumptions are that real incomes grow at 1% annually, individuals plan to retire at 65, life 
expectancies are known with certainty, and that no bequests are made other than the 
current equity in the principal residence. 
The evidence suggests that actual saving rates are quite consistent with people behaving 
as if they were attempting to smooth consumption over their life cycle.  If among the many 
possible definitions of adequacy, one were to agree that saving at a rate which would 
allow consumption smoothing represents a plausible definition, then based on the limited 
information we have available, we find no significant evidence of gross under-saving for 
retirement by New Zealanders.   
There are important limitations in the data for measuring what the actual rate of household 
saving really is.  It has been shown that the definition of saving has a critical effect.  In 
particular when durable expenditure is all regarded as current consumption in the year of 
purchase the actual saving rates fall, as they are quite sensitive to small changes in 
absolute levels of income and consumption.  With durables included in consumption the 
median actual saving rates typically fall below the prescribed rates; however this is not the 
case for the average savings rates for a particular group; they appear to be more than 
sufficient to sustain their consumption levels in retirement. 
There is of course a distribution of saving rates across any population group, and 
regardless of the median level of savings for the group, some individuals might be saving  
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at a rate which later, they may come to view as “too low”.  Even if all households were 
saving adequately this should not be interpreted as indicating that the nation as a whole is 
saving adequately. That may or may not be the case – but in any event is not a question 
that can be resolved by looking at the savings of one sector in isolation.
26
 
It should be stressed that we have deliberately adopted a conservative position in 
estimating future retirement incomes; the net effect of these conservative assumptions is 
to make the required saving rates we estimate higher than they would otherwise be.  We 
allow for no further capital appreciation on housing, farms, commercial or rental 
properties, time shares and all other property.  We exclude the primary residence from the 
calculation of the retirement annuity; ie no equity in the house is used to support 
retirement incomes. We assume a modest rate of return on other assets. 
We assume full survivor benefits; ie, the same real consumption as enjoyed prior to the 
death of a partner is available to the surviving partner.  In other words, the level of pre-
retirement consumption is assumed to be sustained until the death of the surviving 
partner.  In fact consumption requirements typically fall with age.  Based on an analysis of 
the Household Economic Survey, Gibson and Scobie (2001) show that the median level of 
consumption expenditure falls by some 30% as the age of the household head increases 
from 65 to 75.  Arguably this could arise due to income being constrained, forcing a 
decline in real consumption.  In fact savings rates (both mean and median) rise, not fall 
over this period.  One would not expect to observe rising saving rates if consumption were 
to be constrained by inadequate income.  We conclude that our assumption of requiring a 
constant level of retirement consumption is conservative, given the evidence that people 
in fact appear to have reduced consumption needs as they grow older. The effect is to 
make the prescribed savings rates higher than they would otherwise be. 
We assume that people face no uncertainty about their life expectancy.
27
  Clearly this is 
not the case in reality.  However for those on modest pre-retirement incomes and for 
whom NZS will constitute the majority of their post-retirement income, this is not an issue 
due to the lifetime annuity aspect of NZS.  This applies to a very significant share of the 
population. 
However, in higher income deciles not all of their retirement income is so protected. That 
part which is represented by NZS carries the lifetime annuity, but the remainder is by our 
assumptions, only protected until they reach the age of their life expectancy, given their 
gender and ethnicity.  It would, therefore be expected that in order to compensate for this 
uncertainty people in the upper income deciles would save at a rate somewhat greater 
than that which would be needed if they could accurately forecast their age at death.  In 
fact, this is precisely that which we observed – those in the upper 40% of the pre-
retirement income distribution appear to save at a rate greater than that prescribed by our 
approach to adequacy.  This phenomenon might well be reinforced by their desire to leave 
bequest beyond the equity in the primary residence which we allowed for.  In short, the 
fact that actual overall saving rates for these age groups exceed those necessary to 
achieve consumption smoothing may well reflect the fact that people do allow for 
uncertainty and their saving incorporates a precautionary component. 
                                                                 
26 For an analysis of the impact of population ageing on the optimal national saving rate see Guest, Bryant and Scobie (2003).  For an 
overview of savings issues see The Treasury (2003). 
27 Dynamic micro-simulation modelling offers the prospect for incorporating uncertainty about such factors as health status, income 
and employment, marriage formation and dissolution and life expectancy in models of retirement wealth accumulation. For a selection 
of models and their applications see NATSEM (2003).  
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A significant proportion of individuals has little or no accumulation and will rely exclusively 
on NZS.  This provides a floor under retirement incomes.  For those aged 56-64 planning 
to retire at 65, NZS would represent an income close to 60% of the median predicted 
retirement income for that group.  Those relying on NZS are from the lower income 
quintiles, and for them the preferred strategy is not necessarily to try and save more; that 
would reduce their current consumption levels which are already low.  If their retirement 
incomes are felt to be too low, higher pre-retirement earnings must eventually be the route 
to greater savings and higher retirement incomes.  Across the entire population 24% 
would make no further savings for retirement if their preferred strategy is to achieve 
consumption smoothing. Of these over half come from the lowest income quintile. 
A dominant theme that emerges from this study, albeit not a surprising one, is that NZS 
plays a critical role in the planning, saving and income for retirement.  There are three 
reasons for this.  In the first place NZS places a floor under the incomes of retirees, such 
that even where some fall below what is arguably a poverty line, the gap is negligible.  
Second, the presence of NZS significantly reduces the inequality of retirement wealth 
accumulation.  Finally, the finding that NZS represents a major portion of the retirement 
wealth accumulation for some groups is consistent both with the basic predictions of the 
life cycle model, and is reinforced by findings for the USA and the UK.  For almost half of 
those in the lowest 40% of the income distribution, their preferred strategy for achieving 
consumption smoothing is to make no additional saving for retirement.  The case for 
arguing that this group is saving “inadequately” for retirement may better be viewed as a 
statement about the absolute level of their pre-retirement incomes, rather than their saving 
behaviour.  Given their level of income together with the expectation of NZS, we find that 
their behaviour is rational when assessed against a model based on smoothing lifetime 
consumption.  
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Appendix Table 1 – Mean and median values of current and projected retirement 
wealth for couples: all age groups: 2001 
Current Wealth  Projected at Age 65 
Current Wealth Quintile  Mean Median  Mean Median 
1 (= lowest)  245,229  247,404  449,446  453,705 
2  338,548 339,017 504,373 506,533 
3  451,124 446,786 606,172 598,986 
4  637,488 633,408 808,565 787,856 
5 (= highest)  1,292,713  1,034,909  1,605,824  1,289,922 
Total Sample      
Housing  wealth  85,502 36,000 85,502 36,000 
Financial  wealth  205,187 51,350  258,875 64,492 
Pension  wealth  26,982 0  37,836 0 
Superannuation  wealth  275,075 270,414 412,394 408,306 
Total  wealth  592,747 446,786 794,607 607,687 
Ethnic Sub-groups      
Pakeha       
Housing  wealth  94,804 52,000 94,804 52,000 
Financial  wealth  242,035 66,479  305,291 85,374 
Pension  wealth  31,306 0  43,508 0 
Superannuation  wealth  279,222 273,918 414,202 410,753 
Total  wealth  647,367 496,751 857,805 656,124 
Māori-Pacific      
Housing  wealth  36,256 0  36,256 0 
Financial  wealth  69,887 8,600  87,927 9,498 
Pension  wealth  13,966 0  20,839 0 
Superannuation  wealth  252,955 243,224 396,080 389,914 
Total  wealth  373,064 301,466 541,101 457,841 
Note: All values are weighted to population averages and are in 2001 dollars.  Ethnicity of a couple refers to that of the respondent. 
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Appendix Table 2  – Mean and median values of current and projected wealth for 
unpartnered individuals: all age groups: 2001 
Current Wealth  Projected at Age 65 
Current Wealth Quintile  Mean Median Mean Median 
1 (= lowest)  117,759  129,172  249,975  259,581 
2  154,304 154,986 277,932 276,024 
3  186,395 184,284 291,313 290,721 
4  278,012 276,251 370,241 372,322 
5 (= highest)  643,737  503,353  786,071  612,104 
Total Sample      
Housing  wealth  40,043 0  40,043 0 
Financial  wealth  64,429 6,480  81,611 8,000 
Pension  wealth  10,237 0  15,110 0 
Superannuation  wealth  160,993 157,385 258,012 256,254 
Total  wealth  275,702 184,230 394,777 310,100 
Ethnic Sub-groups      
Pakeha      
Housing  wealth  45,996 0  45,996 0 
Financial wealth  76,215  9,190  95,270  12,384 
Pension  wealth  11,811 0  17,709 0 
Superannuation  wealth  166,937 163,711 264,665 263,552 
Total  wealth  300,960 204,405 423,640 332,780 
Māori-Pacific       
Housing  wealth  15,630 0  15,630 0 
Financial  wealth  34,885 811  46,503 829 
Pension  wealth  4,769 0  6,743 0 
Superannuation  wealth  142,641 139,062 235,230 237,271 
Total  wealth  197,925 146,084 304,106 254,280 
Male       
Housing  wealth  29,261 0  29,261 0 
Financial wealth  89,496  8,700  114,565  11,487 
Pension  wealth  12,125 0  18,860 0 
Superannuation  wealth  145,781 142,618 240,243 241,531 
Total  wealth  276,663 165,879 402,929 283,071 
Female       
Housing  wealth  48,425 0  48,425 0 
Financial  wealth  44,942 4,781  55,993 5,511 
Pension  wealth  8,769 0  12,196 0 
Superannuation  wealth  172,819 172,570 271,826 270,036 
Total  wealth  274,955 194,056 388,440 328,483 
Note: All values are weighted to population averages and are in 2001 dollars. 